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Diversification, Coordination Costs and Organizational Rigidity:  
Evidence from Microdata 
 
Abstract:  This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational 
rigidity on the returns to diversification.  The central thesis is that coordination costs 
offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, 
further constraining economies of scope.  The empirical tests of this proposition identify 
the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business-unit and firm 
productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxi and limousine firms.  
The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically 
and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16% 
decrease in paid ride-miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other 
costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency.  The findings suggest that 
coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the 
scope of the firm. 
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Introduction 
 
When firms diversify into new business segments, economies of scope are achieved by 
coordinating production decisions across new and legacy business units (Teece 1980, 
1982).  While there may be aggregate benefits of coordination, coordination is not 
costless.  Resources that were optimized ex ante, with respect to maximizing business 
unit performance, may be underutilized ex post, as business-unit decisions are sublimated 
to serve the greater good of the overall firm.  Moreover, coordination is achieved by 
modifying contractual structures and routines (Williamson, 1999; Nelson and Winter, 
1982).  To the extent that organizational change is not frictionless, organizational rigidity 
increases the coordination costs of diversification and constrains economies of scope by 
creating a barrier to adaptation.  Consistent with the prior literature, the paper defines 
coordination costs as costs that arise from managing task interdependencies (Jones and 
Hill, 1987; Gulati and Singh, 1998) and organizational rigidity as the cost of 
reformulating (or failing to reformulate) previously institutionalized routines and 
practices in legacy businesses (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005).  
While understanding how firms respond organizationally to the challenges of 
diversification is of great importance, there has been little emphasis on coordination and 
organizational rigidity costs in the diversification literature, perhaps because of the 
difficulty scholars face distinguishing between different types of diversification costs.   
 
The paper develops and tests two propositions:  first, that coordination costs act as an 
offset to economies of scope for diversifiers, particularly in related diversification when 
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achieving synergies depends upon coordinating activities across divisions; and second, 
that organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies 
of scope, because institutionalized organizational routines and practices are costly to 
change.  The propositions are tested using a unique data set, consisting of detailed 
establishment-level observations on every major taxicab and limousine fleet in the United 
States, for the years 1992 and 1997, from the Economic Census.  Taxicabs offer an 
industrial context that is particularly well-suited for analysis of coordination costs and 
organizational rigidity, as the taxi segment of the ground passenger transportation 
industry is comprised of thousands of firms producing roughly homogenous outputs in 
hundreds of heterogeneous geographically isolated markets.  The homogenous nature of 
production in the taxi industry allows for the creation of an economically meaningful 
comparative measure of firm performance, while exogenous variation in local markets 
identifies the impact of diversification on productivity.   
 
The empirical tests identify the productivity effects of coordination and organizational 
rigidity costs, in the context of related diversification.  Although the organizational 
rigidity analysis does not distinguish between the direct costs of adapting existing 
organizational systems and the foregone efficiency costs of failing to adapt following 
diversification, the paper estimates the cumulative effect of the costs of organizational 
rigidity, associated with diversification.  The results show that both coordination costs 
and organizational rigidity costs, net of other costs and benefits of diversification and 
incumbency, are economically and statistically significant, with organizational rigidity 
itself accounting for a 16% decrease in paid ride-miles per taxi in incumbent diversifiers.  
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The paper makes two distinct contributions to the literature.  First, it fills a gap in the 
diversification literature by empirically testing for the existence of coordination costs as 
an offset to economies of scope.  Second, the paper takes a step toward integrating the 
insights of the organizational rigidity literature with the literature on firm scope by 
developing and testing a theory of how organizational rigidity influences the returns to 
diversification.   
 
Theory and related literature 
 
Since Rumelt (1974), the strategy literature has emphasized synergies that arise from 
related diversification.  Synergies, or economies of scope, are, by definition, benefits that 
firms achieve through coordinating production across business units that cannot be 
achieved when production is optimized independently within business units (Teece, 1980, 
1982).  While synergy results from coordination, achieving synergy comes at the cost of 
implementing and maintaining coordinated production (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987).  Thus, 
realized economies of scope associated with diversification are equal to potential 
economies of scope less the costs of implementing new coordination procedures.   
 
Coordination costs are costs that arise from organizational interdependencies (Jones and 
Hill, 1987).  While in theory the costs of organizational interdependency might include 
all of the costs of diversification, the literature on the costs of diversification typically 
focus on corporate-level agency costs.  For example, corporate managers may diversify 
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the firm to protect their jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981), to increase the value of their skills 
to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), or to build empires (Jensen, 1986).  Agency costs 
may also arise between corporate managers and operating managers in diversifying firms 
because corporate managers‟ efficient span of control is limited by their ability to 
adequately monitor the activities of diverse business units (Penrose, 1959; Schoar 2002).  
Internal capital markets represent one important mechanism by which corporate 
managers can destroy value, either because they are poorly informed about operating 
units or because managers engage in ill-advised corporate “socialism” (Lamont, 1997; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  Similarly, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) discuss how 
influence costs arise in diversified firms when operating units lobby the corporate center 
for corporate largess.  
 
While the literature on the costs of diversification delivers a number of important 
insights, costs are usually conceptualized as value destroying mistakes made by corporate 
managers.  Thus, the main theoretical thrust of the literature on the costs of 
diversification has been about the efficiency of the corporate center following 
diversification, and the main question the empirical literature on the costs of the 
diversification has grappled with is whether diversification destroys value (Wernerfeldt 
and Montgomery, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).   
 
This paper takes a different approach.  Rather than focusing on corporate-level agency 
costs, the paper considers the impact of coordination costs on the firm‟s operating units, 
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following diversification.  This emphasis on coordination costs builds on the insights of 
the early theoretical literature on diversification, which proposes that coordination costs 
are manifest at the operating unit level as a cost of substituting corporate governance for 
market governance (Jones and Hill, 1988).  Thus, coordination costs are conceptually 
distinct from corporate-level agency costs in that they are costs of coordinating 
production across business units, even when the corporate center acts in good faith, 
effectively monitors its business units, provides appropriate incentives, and efficiently 
allocates capital. 
 
As in Hoskisson and Hitt (1988), this paper proposes that coordination costs should 
always be non-zero unless optimizing each business unit independently also optimizes 
both jointly, in which case there is no need to integrate them.  Yet, if each business unit 
can be optimized on a stand-alone basis, altering the organization of any business unit to 
achieve coordination benefits across business units must sub-optimize the stand-alone 
value of that business unit.  Thus, diversification increases firm value at the cost of sub-
optimizing at least one business unit‟s stand-alone organization.   
 
The theory proposed is consistent with Levinthal and Wu (2006), who conceptualize the 
benefits and costs of diversification in terms of the impact of integration on capacity 
constrained versus scale free resources.  Synergy arises when joint production increases 
utilization of scale free resources, whereas coordinated production is costly when it taxes 
capacity constrained resources.  In their model, net profit from sharing resources within a 
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firm includes both the costs and benefits of diversification with respect to shared 
resources.   
 
While Levinthal and Wu (2006) describe conditions necessary for diversification to 
create value, the coordination cost literature implies that achieving synergies from shared 
resources is not a sufficient condition for determining whether diversification creates 
value because diversifying firms also encounter bureaucratic costs of coordinating 
resources (Jones and Hill, 1987).  In Jones and Hill (1987) achieving synergies from 
shared resources leads firms to reorganize, sub-optimizing the utilization of non-shared 
resources by blunting operating unit incentives or imposing rules and procedures that 
hinder decentralized decision making.  Thus, coordination costs associated with both 
shared and non-shared resources are expected to be positive, even when realized 
economies of scope are positive.   
 
The insight that non-shared activities and resources may be sub-optimized by 
diversification is particularly important for understanding why diversification leads to 
operating costs, even when integration primarily takes place at the corporate level.  
Indeed, it is precisely the goal of pursuing potential synergies that leads to coordination 
costs.  The first hypothesis, therefore, predicts that related diversification in pursuit of 
potential synergies leads to coordination costs that act as an offset to realized economies 
of scope. 
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Hypothesis 1: In diversifying firms, coordination costs attenuate realized 
economies of scope.   
 
The first hypothesis predicts the existence of coordination costs in diversified firms.  To 
refine our understanding of the mechanisms underlying coordination costs the paper 
builds on the insights of organizational theory, particularly the idea that routines and 
contracts are costly to change once they are institutionalized, which Kaplan and 
Henderson (2005) call organizational rigidity.
1
   
 
The concept of organizational rigidity is closely related to Leonard-Barton‟s (1992) 
proposition that the very routines that create competitive advantage in firms are 
vulnerable to becoming “core rigidities”, or sources of competitive disadvantage, when 
firms confront environmental changes.  Tushman and Anderson (1986) discuss a similar 
phenomenon in their research on the impact of technological discontinuities on firm 
performance.  They find that competency destroying technological change render existing 
techniques obsolete, forcing firms to undergo a costly process by which they acquire new 
skills, ability and knowledge.  Henderson and Clark (1990) build on this insight to 
propose that certain kinds of technological change can destroy organizational capital 
accumulated in incumbents, allowing start-ups to outperform them.  This paper builds on 
and extends the prior conceptions of organizational rigidity by including foregone 
                                                 
1
 The paper focuses on organizational rigidity, as opposed to organizational inertia or structural inertia, a 
concept frequently used to study population-level organizational change (Hannan and Freeman; 1977, 
1984).  While organizational rigidity and organizational inertia are related concepts, in that they both make 
predictions about organizational adaptation costs, the former applies to rational choices firms make as they 
trade off coordination costs and economies of scope, while the latter applies best to population-level 
selection effects and does not make a clear prediction about how diversification influences the operations of 
the firm (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991).   
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productivity opportunities as well as the costs associated with renegotiating contracts.  
The paper also extends the implications of rigid organizations beyond contexts where 
there are exogenous technological discontinuities, positing that organizational rigidity is a 
common friction faced by all incumbent firms contemplating organization changes, and 
of particular importance when firms pursue synergies through coordination.   
 
In the context of diversification, organizational rigidity can be seen as an additional cost 
of pursuing potential economies of scope, further limiting realized economies of scope 
associated with horizontal integration.  Figure 1 shows how the concept of organizational 
rigidity adds a new dimension to extant models of coordination costs by illustrating the 
relationships between diversification, economies of scope (potential and realized), 
coordination costs, and organizational rigidity. 
 
****************************** 
****FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
****************************** 
 
When firms diversify, they reorganize their operating units to create value by altering 
existing routines and contracts.  A theory of organizational rigidity predicts that 
reorganization is costly, in the sense that it destroys tacit knowledge embedded in 
existing processes, leads to incentive problems when contracts are re-negotiated, and 
creates frictions that lead to foregone productivity opportunities.  For example, more rigid 
firms will allow higher levels of cannibalization and will engage in less cross-selling to 
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avoid a more extensive overhaul of their legacy operations.  In the language of Levinthal 
and Wu (2006), organizational rigidity increases coordination costs associated with non-
shared resources reducing the benefits of resource sharing.  This insight leads directly to 
the second hypothesis:  organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, taxing the 
productivity of diversifying firms through direct adaptation costs and indirect costs of 
foregone opportunities.   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Organizational rigidity increases coordination costs 
reducing realized economies of scope. 
 
The second hypothesis predicts that coordination costs are increasing in organizational 
rigidity, while economies of scope are decreasing in organizational rigidity.  While past 
work has focused on the costs of structuring new activities and cross-unit 
interconnections to capture new synergies (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jones and Hill, 
1988), this paper examines organizational rigidities – the costs of changing (or not 
changing) previously institutionalized routines and practices in legacy businesses.  Since 
existing organizations are, by definition, more rigid than start-up organizations, 
organizational rigidity costs are particular to incumbent firms, while coordination costs 
are common to all diversified firms.  The key testable implication of organizational 
rigidity, in the context of diversification, is, therefore, that the productivity advantage 
focused incumbents typically have over focused start-ups will shrink when both 
incumbents and start-ups are diversified.    
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By considering how organizational change associated with diversification influences 
competition between start-ups (de novo entrants) and diversifying incumbents, the paper 
builds on and extends a nascent body of research, which may be called the de novo and 
de alio (lateral) entry literature.  Carroll, Bigelow, Sidel, and Tsai (1996) and Khessina 
and Carroll (2001) present evidence that lateral entrants – firms that enter a new business 
from within an industry – tend to survive longer than start-ups in scale intensive 
industries.  In related work, Klepper and Simons (2000) compare different types of lateral 
entrants into the television manufacturing industry and find that pre-entry experience 
facilitates different levels of knowledge spillovers in R&D.  This paper builds on the de 
novo and de alio literature by explicitly considering how entry status influences the 
returns to diversification.  While the de novo and de alio literature typically focuses on 
firm survival in the new business as the key outcome variable, this paper focuses on 
business unit productivity as the key measure of firm performance.  Diversified firms 
may outlast focused firms because they have deep pockets or less variable cash flows, 
reasons unrelated to productivity.  Thus, the finding that diversification leads to falling 
productivity is complementary to the de novo and de alio literature, suggesting that 
economies of scope also play a role in determining competitive advantage in the 
competition between de novo and de alio entrants. 
 
Institutional Background 
 
The taxicab segment of the ground passenger transportation industry (hereafter the 
“taxicab industry”) is particularly well-suited for studying the productivity consequences 
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of coordination costs and organizational rigidity, in the context of diversification.  One 
attractive feature of the taxicab industry is that it is a local business with regulated prices.  
Since taxi markets are geographically segmented, the nationwide taxicab industry is 
actually a collection of hundreds of independent city-level markets, providing 
considerable variation to identify the effects of interest.  I exploit the fact that firms face 
regulated prices, in their local markets, to develop a precise and economically meaningful 
measure of firm performance that can be interpreted as physical output per unit of input.  
Furthermore, the level of horizontal integration between taxis and limousines changed 
dramatically during the sample period due to widespread regulatory changes, creating a 
quasi-natural experiment in lateral diversification.
2
   
 
Prior to the 1990s taxicab and black car operations were strictly legally separated by local 
regulation.  Following the high-profile “Freedom Cab” case (Jones v. Temmer)  in 
Colorado in 1993, which was not directly related to cross-ownership, state legislatures 
became increasingly involved in mitigating these conflicts by passing laws wresting 
regulatory authority over limousines from local regulators (Cox, 1993).  As regulatory 
limitations on cross ownership were removed private-for-hire fleets began to operate both 
taxicabs and limousines.     
 
The logic behind expanding from taxicab into limousine services is straightforward.  
Limousine services represent a higher priced, differentiated service, produced in a 
                                                 
2
 For so freely sharing the wealth of knowledge they have accumulated regarding the U.S. taxicab industry, 
I am indebted to:  C.J. Christina, Jason Diaz, Thomas Drischler, John Hamilton, Stan Faulwetter, Alfred La 
Gasse, Kimberly Lewis, Joe Morra; Marco Henry, John Perry, David Reno, Aubby Sherman, Doug 
Summers, and especially Craig Leisy. 
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manner that is qualitatively similar to taxicab services.  For example, fleets recruit 
drivers, acquire vehicles and permits, match drivers to cars as well as schedule and 
deliver rides to passengers.  Multidivisional (e.g., taxi and limousine) fleets attempt to 
spread their fixed costs, in each of these functions, across the boundaries of the taxi and 
limousine businesses.  Taxi firms also report that they up-sell taxi customers to 
limousines where possible, employing limousines to meet unmet taxi demand during 
peak times to smooth overall capacity utilization.   
 
Taken together, the advantages of integration can be substantial.  However, taxi fleet 
operators also describe several coordination-related costs of operating both taxicabs and 
limousines, in the same fleet.  Firms face capacity utilization challenges immediately 
following diversification.  Implementing new contracts and monitoring systems often 
frustrates existing drivers, leading to defections.  Diversifying firms often face customer 
defections as well, particularly when customers are required to participate in new 
protocols, such as administering vouchers to employees.  Moreover, managing two types 
of drivers, vehicles, incentive schemes and customers can create complexity that is 
difficult to manage.  For example, taxi managers observed that, following diversification, 
they spent more time on recruiting independent drivers and customer relationship 
management issues, managerial challenges not faced by taxi fleet operators that focus on 
transactional spot-market exchange.   
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In addition, variation in incentive schemes
3
 can lead to coordination failures, particularly 
channel conflict when taxi drivers refuse to cede lucrative rides to limousines, and 
decreased utilization of taxicabs (cannibalization), as fleets steer higher value rides 
toward limousines.  While cannibalization directly offsets the gross benefits of up-selling, 
steering can also lead to more pernicious outcomes, as taxi drivers subvert the 
dispatching system by picking up fares intended for limousines, thereby creating chaos in 
the dispatching system.   
 
Firms may respond to internal conflicts by keeping their dispatching processes separate, 
but this also reduces the benefits of integration.  Rather than maintaining separate 
dispatching operations, diversifiers tend to change their contracting practices, with 
respect to asset ownership, to manage cannibalization, contracting more extensively with 
professional independent drivers who are better able to operate in a more complex 
dispatching environment.
4
  Organizational changes at diversifying taxi firms are 
illustrative of the broader set of issues diversifying firms face.  Diversifiers choose 
between capturing operational synergies, by adapting organizationally and closely 
coordinating the operations of different business units, and avoiding the coordination 
costs of diversification, by keeping businesses separate. 
 
There appear to be significant coordination costs as well as benefits from operating an 
integrated taxi and limousine firm.  The key question, with respect to the second 
                                                 
3
 Firms face an important moral hazard problem because they cannot monitor taxi driver effort.  The near-
ubiquitous solution is for taxi drivers to be compensated with high-powered incentives.  By contrast, 
monitoring is much easier in the black car business, since most rides are dispatched.  Therefore, black car 
drivers often are compensated with lower-powered incentives. 
4
 These results are available from the author upon request.  
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hypothesis, predicting that organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, is whether 
incumbent firms can shift to the new organizational optimum costlessly or whether their 
existing contracts and routines constrain their ability to adapt relative to a diversified 
start-up.  Anecdotally, firms report diversification-related costs that stem from 
organizational adaptations:  retraining dispatchers, re-contracting with drivers and 
renegotiating with clients.  If coordination costs and organizational rigidity are not only 
salient, but also economically meaningful, we should see their effects on business unit 
and firm productivity.  To formally test for coordination costs and organizational 
rigidities in the production function, the paper turns to the data.   
 
Data and Measures 
 
The core dataset for this paper comes from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census.  The 
Economic Census includes every taxi and limousine firm in the United States with at 
least one employee (SIC code 412100 [taxicabs] and 411920 [limousines]).  The 
comprehensiveness of the database is extremely useful as it allows us to track every 
incumbent firm with at least one employee over time and to observe every new and 
lateral entrant into the taxi and limousine market in 1997.   The database contains detailed 
establishment-level data on firm revenue, line of business revenue at the six-digit 
industry level, number of vehicles by type (e.g., taxi vs. limousine) and geographic 
identifiers.
5
  
 
                                                 
5
 Less than 1% of establishments were in firms that had multiple locations.  Using an alternative sample 
that excluded multi-establishment firms had no effect on the results. 
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The 1992 and 1997 Economic Census contain complete records on 1,020 and 1,106 
observations, respectively; on taxi firms with at least two taxicabs; $10,000 of taxi 
revenue; and, at least, two taxi fleets in their market (county).
6
  I use all of the complete 
observations for computing total factor productivity and for cross-sectional tests of the 
impact of diversification and entry status on productivity.
7
  The cross-sectional samples 
consist of approximately 30% of all taxi firms (with at least one employee) and between 
50-65% of the $1 billion taxicab industry.  For tests of the impact of diversification on 
within-firm business-unit-specific asset utilization, I use the subset of firms that existed 
and reported complete data in both 1992 and 1997 (n=560).  The within-firm changes 
sample includes approximately half the firms and about 70% of revenue in the cross 
sectional regressions.  
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for both the cross-sectional data sets and the 
within-firm changes set.  Table 1 reveals that in 1992, 99% of taxi firms were single 
product firms.   By 1997, 62% of taxi firms also operated limousines (40% are 
incumbents while 22% are start-ups).  I define lateral diversifiers from taxicab to 
limousine operations as those firms that had SIC code 412100 and no limousines in their 
fleet in 1992, but had at least one limousine in their fleet by 1997.
8
    
                                                 
6
 Approximately 2,000 observations, in 1992 and 1997, are not used because they do not contain the 
number of taxicabs in their fleet.  This set is primarily composed of administrative record (AR) 
observations – very small firms that the Economic Census does not actually survey but rather imputes 
values for.  Using alternative samples, with more or less stringent sample restrictions, led to the same 
qualitative findings. 
7
 Firms that existed in 1992, but were small or reported incomplete data, are properly treated as incumbents 
(rather than start-ups) in 1997 cross sectional regressions. 
8
 Alternative measures of lateral entry, including measures that required taxi firms to have a certain fraction 
(e.g., 10%) of their vehicle capital in limousines or attain a certain percentage (e.g., 10%) of their revenue 
in limousines were very highly correlated with the “single limousine” measure of lateral entry and yielded 
qualitatively identical results. 
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Empirical tests on taxicab performance, which is defined in terms of productivity as in 
Hill and Snell (1989), are facilitated by the relatively simple and homogenous production 
function in the taxicab industry, which minimizes measurement error in the key reduced-
form establishment-level productivity measures I employ.  I define the profit function in 
the usual way with two parameters that link profitability and productivity to the firm‟s 
entry and diversification status.  Profit π for an input and output price-taking firm i, in 
business-unit j = {Taxi, Limousine}, and geographic market m, which can be represented 
by: 
 
(1) πi = (pTm-cTm)YiT(θ,ζ) + (pBm-cBm)YiB(θ,ζ)  - F(Ki,ζ), 
Yj = Aij(θ,ζ)Kij
βk
Lij
βl
, 
 
where Y is output in units (ride-mile equivalents or “rides” assuming miles per ride are 
approximately constant across vehicles within a market), subscripts T and B index taxicab 
and limousine operations; F>0 is the fixed cost of operations, where fixed costs are 
increasing in total capital (K) and scope (ζ).  The market price per ride p>0 and the cost 
of selling an additional ride c>0 convert physical output into gross profit, where physical 
output Y is generated by a production function that transforms inputs capital (K) and 
labor (L) using technology (A), which can be interpreted as total factor productivity in 
quantities (TFPQ).
9
  The two key parameters θ = {0,1} and ζ = {0,1} index whether the 
                                                 
9
 Since the taxi and limousine industry production function is approximately Leontief, the labor term is 
dropped in the final specification (equation (2)) below.   
 19 
firm is an incumbent or start-up, and whether the firm is diversified or focused, 
respectively.   
 
It is clear from equation (1) that potential fixed cost savings play an important role in 
determining firm strategy with respect to economies of scope.  Therefore, caution must 
be used when interpreting differences in productivity as differences in profitability.  The 
key assumption required to connect productivity to profitability is that fixed costs are 
independent of entry status θ, as is evident in equation (1).10   
 
When market prices are fixed and labor is used proportionately to capital, as in the taxi 
market, total factor productivity in quantities (TFPQ)
11
 can be computed for a focused 
establishment i, at time t is as the residual of a regression
12
 of a time-specific intercept α, 
a market-level fixed effect λ, and the log of establishment-specific capital k, on the log of 
dollar denominated revenue r as in: 
 
(2) rit = αt + λmt+ βtkit + TFPQit . 
 
The key feature of (2) is that TFPQ can be interpreted as a measure of physical asset 
utilization relative to other fleets in the same market that is standardized to have mean 
                                                 
10
 Additionally, to calculate the impact of differences in productivity on differences in profit, holding fixed 
costs constant, productivity also has to be scaled by gross margin = (p-c)/p.  
11
 See Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) for a  detailed derivation of TFPQ 
12
 As in Solow (1957) total factor productivity is estimated as the residual from a production function. 
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zero within market (county).
13
  To calculate pooled (taxi and limousine) productivity, r is 
log pooled revenue and k is log pooled capital.
14
   
 
Specification 
 
Changes in taxi productivity following diversification into limousines 
 
The baseline test measures the effect of diversification on within-firm changes in taxi 
productivity.  I implement this test by taking differences in productivity, at the firm level 
from 1992 and 1997, to eliminate unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics that 
influence productivity and using (3):   
 
(3) ΔTFPQi = B0 + •B1ΔSTATUSi + Xc,iBc + ei, 
 
where ΔTFPQ is the change in taxicab productivity as defined above and ΔSTATUS is a 
categorical variable that captures whether the firm diversified during the sample period.  
Xc,i is a vector of controls that could plausibly shift the supply or demand structure of the 
local taxicab market including:  legal form of organization
15
; size; changes in local 
market population; changes in the number of taxis in the market; changes in the number 
of limousines in the market; and e is an error term.  Since taxicab capital under 
                                                 
13
 TFPQ is winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles, though doing so has no impact on the results.   
14 The pooled calculation can only be interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP) since limousine prices 
are not regulated at the local level.  While TFPQ is ideal, TFP delivers a useful, if imperfect, measure of 
multi-factor productivity. 
15
 Legal form of organization is defined as the firm‟s tax status as reported to the IRS, which is coded as a 
categorical variable equal to one if the firm is a corporation and zero otherwise.  Alternative specifications 
that used a vector of legal forms of organization, including corporation, partnership, sole-proprietorship and 
co-operative had no effect of the results. 
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management is included as a continuous variable in the first stage of the total factor 
productivity calculation, size is included non-parametrically in the second stage, using 
the intuitive, which correspond to each 1/3 of the size distribution.  The results are robust 
to alternative measures of size and to specifications that include firm-level fixed effects, 
rather than computing changes in firm characteristics directly.
16
   
 
Identification strategy  
 
The key factor identifying the tests of the first hypothesis, which predicts coordination 
costs offset (realized) economies of scope, is that market-level characteristics 
exogenously influence the firm‟s decision to diversify.  In the ideal experiment, we 
would randomly assign the “treatment” diversification, and factors of production, and 
observe how productivity changed in the treatment group compared to a control group.  
Measuring within-firm changes in productivity, in the presence of a regulatory shock, 
reduces the need for an alternative identification strategy.  However, one cannot be 
certain that there are not time-varying firm-specific shocks that are correlated with 
diversification and the outcome variables of interest.  In particular, we might be 
concerned that firms diversify after being exposed to negative productivity shock.  
Diversifying in response to unobserved negative productivity shocks is a threat to causal 
inference because an exogenous shock to firm strategy sets (e.g., the regulatory change) 
does not prevent endogenous firm choice from biasing OLS estimates. 
 
                                                 
16
 Because there are only two time periods I compute differences at the firm-level to eliminate the effect of 
time invariant unobserved firm specific characteristics rather than using firm fixed effects. 
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I address endogeneity issues using lagged (e.g., 1992) concentration of limousines in the 
firm‟s market as an instrumental variable (IV) for the entry decision.  Lagged 
concentration of limousines in the firm‟s market is a good instrument for horizontal entry, 
since incumbent firms will be more interested in entering the limousine market when it is 
not dominated by a major player.  When a few major players dominate a market, it is 
usually because they have developed deep relationships in the lucrative corporate market 
for limousine service (Taxi, Limousine and Paratransit Association Fact Book:  
Limousine and Sedan Division, 2004).  High limousine concentration also represents an 
entry barrier because concentrated competition increases the threat of retaliation.
17
  
Furthermore, lagged market concentration of limousines should not affect changes in any 
given firm‟s productivity levels (relative to other firms in the same market).  Results are 
robust to alternative instruments that proxy for the degree of competition in the local 
limousine market and to correcting for selection effects based on all observable 
characteristics of firms using propensity score matching.   
 
Diversification and the costs of organizational rigidity 
 
Estimating the impact of diversification and entry status on the costs of organizational 
rigidity in cross-section requires some additional assumptions.  The key identifying 
assumption is that fixed costs are independent of entry status conditional on firm scope.  
The fixed cost assumption seems reasonable given the nature of the industry as fixed 
                                                 
17
 Retaliation could be economic or physical.  A number of sources have noted the connection between the 
ground passenger transportation industry and organized crime, making the threat of physical conflict a very 
real consideration in the industry.  Celona (2004a and 2004b) reports explicit connections between 
organized crime and intimidation of limo drivers. 
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costs are typically facilities, dispatching systems and back-office labor, which should not 
differ between start-ups and incumbents conditional on the scope of the operation.  I 
formulate the connection between total factor productivity and the costs of organizational 
rigidity more formally in the appendix section B.   
 
To test the second hypothesis that the productivity gap between incumbents and start-ups 
will shrink, when both incumbents and start-ups are diversified, I use (4): 
 
(4) TFPi = β0 + STATUSi•βS + Xc,iβc + εi, 
 
where subscript t is suppressed because the cross-sectional tests are all performed in1997, 
TFP is multifactor productivity in the pooled (taxi and limo) regressions and total factor 
productivity in quantities (TFPQ) in the taxi-only regressions, STATUS is a vector of 
dummies that capture the interaction between entry status and firm scope (e.g., single 
product incumbent, lateral diversifier, taxi-only start-up, diversified entrant).  Xc,it is a 
vector controls as above, except that the controls are in levels rather than in changes, and 
ε is an error term.   
 
Taking differences d1 in the coefficients that measure the relative productivity of single 
product start-ups and single product incumbents, [d1 = (βs | taxi-only start-up) - (βs | taxi-
only incumbents)] establishes the net incumbency advantage.  I then use the difference d2 
in the coefficients that measure the relative productivity of taxi and limo start-ups and 
lateral diversifiers, [d2 = (βs | taxi and limo start-ups) - (βs | lateral diversifiers)], to 
 24 
establish the combined effect of a change in scope and the advantages of incumbency.  
The difference in these two differences, C(δ) = d1 - d2, recovers the net cost of 
organizational rigidity – the main test of the second hypothesis.  While the empirical tests 
described identify organizational rigidity costs by comparing diversified incumbents 
against diversified start-ups, the existence of the latter is only a convenient empirical 
device.  Conceptually, organizational rigidity costs should always act as a barrier to 
adaptation in the context of diversification.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Diversification and coordination costs 
 
Figure 2 shows the kernel density distributions of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) 
for future diversifiers and non-diversifiers in 1992 and diversifiers and non-diversifiers in 
1997.  Visually diversification appears to have a significant effect on the relative 
productivity of diversified firms‟ taxis.  More formally, Table 2 estimates of the impact 
of diversification on taxi utilization.  Column (1a) shows that lateral entry into the 
limousine business is correlated with a within-firm change in taxicab productivity of -
0.45 (-36%) and is significant at the 1% level.
18
   
 
The inclusion of a number of exogenous firm and market level controls reduces the point 
estimate to -0.41 (-34%) without affecting the statistical significance of the result 
                                                 
18
The percentage change in productivity is computed from the coefficient estimate on diversification 
according to 1- exp(B1), for B1<0. 
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(column 2a).  Changes in the competitive dimensions of the market, e.g., the number of 
taxicabs and limousines operated by other fleets, do not have much influence on the costs 
of lateral expansion because differencing total factor productivity, at the market level, 
leaves little variation to be explained by changes in these variables.  The coefficient on 
changes in taxi ownership rates in other fleets is positive and significant because permit 
prices are correlated with expected positive future productivity shocks.  When permit 
prices rise, drivers are more likely to face wealth constraints, limiting independent 
ownership of taxicabs.  However, the economic magnitude of the effect is small at 5% 
(0.20 x 0.27) in the average market.   
 
****************************** 
****FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
****************************** 
 
Since the decision to diversify laterally is endogenous, the OLS results discussed above 
can only be interpreted as correlations.  To control for the endogeneity of the lateral entry 
strategy with the change in productivity, I use the lagged level of concentration of 
limousines (L-HHI) in the firm‟s market as an instrument for lateral entry, where L-HHI 
is expected to be strongly negatively correlated with lateral entry.  Column (1b) shows 
2SLS estimates of the effect of diversification on changes in productivity.  The first-stage 
results are strong (F-statistic of 32) and in the direction expected, indicating that the 
instrument is powerful and operating as predicted (see 1SLS summary statistics at the 
bottom of column 1b).  The point estimate on diversification in the univariate 2SLS 
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specification is -0.53 (-41%) and is significant at the 1% level.  The results are 
qualitatively unchanged with controls (column 2b).  The interpretation is that there is a 
causal relationship between lateral entry and changes in core taxicab business-unit 
productivity.   
 
The results support the contention of the first hypothesis, which predicts the existence of 
coordination costs at the operating division level, but are incomplete with respect to 
organizational rigidity costs.  To test the second hypothesis, I turn to cross-sectional 
evidence.  
 
Diversification and organizational rigidity  
 
Figure 3 shows the kernel density plots of the cross-section of taxi-only productivity for 
the four types of firms in the sample {taxi-only incumbents, incumbent diversifiers, taxi-
only start-ups, and diversified start-ups}.  It is clear from the figure that the productivity 
advantage of incumbency is smaller for diversified firms than for focused taxi firms.  
Table 3 shows this result formally.  The key result in Table 3 is the estimate of the cost of 
organizational rigidity C(δ), which is derived from the relative productivity estimates of 
the four types of firms in the sample (see the appendix section B for the explicit 
formulation of the relationship between productivity and the costs of organizational 
rigidity).  Overall, pooled (taxi and limo) performance is examined as a robustness check 
to understand whether the taxi-only productivity effect of diversification can be explained 
by differences in productivity in limousines between start-ups and incumbents. 
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****************************** 
****FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE**** 
****************************** 
 
As in the within-firm regressions, the results of the cross-sectional regressions show large 
economic and statistical effects of diversification on productivity.  The table also shows a 
pattern consistent with the assumption that start-ups are generally disadvantaged 
compared to incumbent firms.  The main cross-sectional productivity results are 
presented in columns 1 and 2, using the taxi-only production characteristics and the taxi-
only subset.  Column 1 shows the results without controls, where the excluded category is 
incumbent firms who did not expand into limousines.  The TFPQ of start-up taxi fleet is 
0.23 below the mean of incumbent firms, while taxi to limo diversifiers and diversified 
start-ups fall 0.66 and 0.67 below TFPQ of incumbents who did not expand into 
limousines.  The difference in the productivity gap between focused and diversified start-
ups and incumbents in the taxi-only case is -0.21 (-19% of TFPQ).
19
  Adding a number of 
controls, in Table 3, for exogenous firm and market-level characteristics reduces the 
coefficient estimates slightly to -0.17 (-16% of TFPQ) and the result continues to be 
significant at the 5% level (column 2, bottom).
20
  The results provide support for 
coordination costs as the mechanism acting to offset synergies, as predicted by the first 
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 The difference in the productivity gap between focused and diversified start-ups and incumbents is 
calculated as the difference in the coefficient estimates on STATUS, C(δ) = d1 - d2, where [d1 = (βs | taxi-
only start-up) - (βs | taxi-only incumbents)] and  [d2 =  (βs | taxi and limo start-ups) - (βs | lateral 
diversifiers)]. In Table 3 column (1), d1 = -0.23, d2 = -.01 and C(δ) = -0.21.   I use STATA‟s lincom 
command to calculate the standard error of C(δ), which is computed as the square-root of a weighted sum 
of the squared standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
20
 Total factor productivity in quantities (TFPQ) can be interpreted as changes in paid ride miles per 
vehicle.   
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hypothesis, since the cross-sectional tests implicitly control for agency costs as well as 
economies of scope; and for the second hypothesis, which predicts that organizational 
rigidity increases coordination costs and constrains economies of scope.   
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Robustness of cross-sectional tests 
 
One potential problem with interpreting the declining taxi-only productivity gap between 
incumbents and start-ups, when both are diversified, is that incumbents may be more 
productive than start-ups in limousines.  Indeed, if part of the measured organizational 
rigidity effect reflects the superior cross-selling ability of incumbents, then lower taxi 
utilization may reflect higher limousine utilization, which we may mistake as 
organizational rigidity.  To address this issue, I examine whether measured organizational 
rigidity costs change when accounting for pooled revenues and capital stock.  Table 3 
column 3 shows that taxi to limo diversifiers‟ and diversified start-ups‟ multifactor 
productivity is far below incumbents who do not diversify (the excluded group), while 
diversified start-ups and focused (taxi only) start-ups are -0.26 (-23% of TFP) behind.  In 
column (3), the adjustment cost estimate is -0.26 (-23% of TFP) and significant at the 5% 
level.  Adding a vector of controls, in column 4, has a small effect on the estimate of 
organizational adjustment costs.  Although the pooled results measure TFP and not 
TFPQ, and are therefore not as precise as the taxi-only estimates, they provide some 
additional evidence that organizational rigidity has real economic implications.   
 
The key identifying assumption, in the cross-sectional tests, is that start-ups decide to 
diversify using the same selection process that incumbents follow.  This assumption 
appears to be reasonable, given the findings in the within-firm regressions and the 
continued use of county-level fixed effects in the cross-sectional tests.  Recall that 1992 
productivity levels were almost identical for both future diversifiers and future non-
 30 
diversifiers, while the 2SLS results in Table 2 showed that the selection effect biases the 
OLS productivity results toward zero.  Therefore, for incumbents, we can be reasonably 
confident that variation in ability (e.g., 1992 productivity) does not drive the 
diversification decision and that, on average, firms that earn the highest marginal returns 
from diversification choose to do so.  If start-ups also choose whether to diversify based 
only on how good they are at diversifying and not based on unobserved (to the 
econometrician) quality differences between firms, the assumption holds, and the cross-
sectional results are well identified.
 21
   
 
Discussion 
 
The existence of coordination costs supports Jones and Hill‟s (1987) contention that there 
are unique risks of related diversification.  If achieving synergies comes at the cost of 
coordinating activities between business units, related diversification can be a high-risk, 
high-reward activity.   
 
The existence of organizational rigidity costs, in the context of diversification, has 
important implications for firm strategy.  If organizational rigidity imposes adaptation 
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 I also verify the robustness of the falling taxicab productivity following diversification result to other 
plausible alternative explanations that have little to do with organizational change, including (1) 
diversification causing the firm to under invest in productivity enhancing technology and (2) diversification 
causing the firm to shift investments away from the taxi business toward the limousine business.  With 
respect to diversification and investment in technology (1), I find that diversification is indeed correlated 
with lower levels of adoption of new dispatching technology, and that new dispatching technology is 
associated with higher productivity for adopters.  However, diversification effects swamp non-adoption 
effects in regressions on changes in productivity that include both factors.  With respect to shifting 
investments to limousines (2), I find that diversifying firms invest almost 50% more in new taxi-specific 
assets than do non-diversifiers, controlling for their size before diversification.   Thus, diversifiers expand 
their limousine and taxi businesses simultaneously, which is inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis 
that diversifiers shift investment away from taxis.  Results are available from the author upon request. 
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costs on existing organizational systems then firms possessing valuable organizational 
assets should be wary of pursuing strategies that rely on achieving operational synergies, 
since organizational change erodes the value of the existing nexus of contracts and 
routines.  More fundamentally, organizational rigidity implies that competitors may be 
able to achieve synergies at a lower cost, even when the focal firm is more productive. 
 
One potential concern with the estimated organizational rigidity effect is that a decline in 
paid ride miles per vehicle of 16% (see Table 3 column 2, bottom) is larger than one 
might have expected a priori.
22
  At least two caveats are in order in interpreting the 
magnitude of the estimated organizational rigidity effect.  First, changes in ride miles per 
vehicle do not translate directly into changes in profits per vehicle because taxis are only 
being driven empty a portion of the time they are not utilized.  Instead firms and drivers 
take shifts off the market and/or shorten shift hours.  If we re-estimated taxi capacity in 
terms of taxi up-time, the utilization effect would be smaller.  However, the ride-miles 
per vehicle measure is still a useful measure of productivity as firms can always sell their 
taxi to another firm in the same market and generate more paid ride-miles.  Second, the 
16% decline in paid ride miles per vehicle is not necessarily the long-run steady state 
effect of diversification as diversified firms may end up selling their marginal taxis rather 
than running them under-utilized.  Thus, the organizational rigidity effect may attenuate 
over time.   
 
  
                                                 
22
 Although on its face 16% seems like a large effect several industry participants reported (anecdotally) 
much larger declines in taxi productivity. 
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Limitations 
 
The decision to diversify depends on the associated costs and benefits, as well as the 
regulatory environment, which may determine whether the choice is available.  This 
paper quantifies some of the costs of integration, but does not quantify all of the potential 
benefits – particularly the long-run benefits.  Thus, it is not surprising that we observe a 
great deal of integration despite the existence of organizational rigidity costs.  Future 
research might extend this work by exploiting a longer time series to understand the 
persistence of coordination costs and organizational rigidities. 
 
A second important limitation to this research is that coordination costs and the costs 
organizational rigidity are not observed directly, but rather are estimated by exploiting 
variation in firm strategies and geographic markets.  Furthermore, the analysis does not 
distinguish between adaptation cost and non-adaptation cost components of 
organizational rigidity.  A further limitation of this paper is the inability to measure the 
extent of task differentiation between business units, which is conjectured to influence 
the magnitude of the organizational rigidity effects.  Measuring coordination and 
organizational rigidity costs directly, as well as understanding adaptation versus non-
adaptation costs and exploring the relationship between task differentiation and 
organizational rigidity represent opportunities for future research. 
 
Finally, the findings of this paper are limited to a single industry and, therefore, the 
results should be generalized cautiously as the magnitude and nature of organizational 
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rigidities may vary extensively across industries.  Nevertheless the results of this work 
seem broadly applicable to industrial contexts where economies of scope are gained by 
sublimating the organization of one line of business to the overall needs of the firm.
23
   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper proposes and tests two related propositions:  (1) that coordination costs, the 
costs that arise from managing task interdependencies, offset economies of scope and (2) 
that organizational rigidity, the costs of reorganizing legacy business unit activities, 
increase coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope in diversifying 
firms.  Conceptually, organizational rigidity includes both costs that arise directly from 
organizational adaptation and indirect costs of foregone productivity gains when adaption 
is too expensive to undertake. 
 
The paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment in diversification, using a rich and novel 
micro-data set on taxi firms to test the influence of diversification on firm performance.  
Within firm changes in taxi utilization is substantially negative following diversification.  
Comparing the productivity of diversified and focused start-ups and incumbent firms 
reveals that, controlling for the benefits of diversification, the productivity advantage 
incumbents have over start-ups is reduced by 16%, when both are diversified.  I interpret 
                                                 
23
 For example, consider Starbucks‟s recent experience selling hot sandwiches at their coffee shops.  The 
company began selling hot sandwiches in 2004, believing that there were economies of scope inherent in 
serving coffee and hot food together, but found the “scent of the warm sandwiches interferes with the 
aroma of the stores that serving hot food . . . and [got in the way of employees‟] ability to make the perfect 
shot of espresso” (Starbucks Press Release, 2008).  While it is difficult to disentangle coordination costs 
from the costs of organizational rigidity from press releases, the problems Starbucks faced with their hot 
sandwich line of business are illustrative of the costs of horizontal expansion as discussed in this paper. 
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these differences in productivity as evidence of coordination costs and organizational 
rigidity.   
 
The existence of coordination and organizational rigidity costs, in the context of 
diversification, has implications for the study of firms as organizations more broadly.  In 
particular, we might expect coordination and organizational rigidity costs to act as a 
brake on horizontal diversification strategies.  More generally, organizational rigidities 
impose a hurdle for any strategy that requires organizational change.  Diversification, 
vertical integration, geographical dispersion, merger activity, and reengineering decisions 
are all potentially influenced by the costs organizational rigidity.  Thus, organizational 
rigidity helps explain the limits to firm change and growth.  Moreover, the finding that 
start-ups are more flexible than incumbents, in the context of diversification, suggests 
that start-ups may be more flexible than incumbents, in a more general sense.  While 
others have argued start-ups respond more effectively than incumbents to technological 
change, this paper provides evidence that start-ups are also more nimble in a broader 
sense. 
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Figure 1 Interrelationships between the main variables of interest 
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Figure 2 Changes in the distributions of total factor productivity ** 
 
Panel A: Distribution of 1992 total factor productivity (TFPQ) 
Total factor productivity conditional on future diversification status (TFPQi1992 | ζ) 
 
This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1992 
conditional on (future) diversification (ζ).  n = 560 
** See Table 2 for regression output that compares the means of this distribution with the means of the 
1997 taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) distribution 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of 1997 total factor productivity (TFPQ) 
Total factor productivity conditional on diversification status (TFPQi1997 | ζ) 
 
This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1997 
conditional on diversification (ζ).  n = 560 
** See Table 2 for regression output that compares the means of this distribution with the means of the 
1992 taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) distribution 
  
Incumbents who do 
not diversify in the 
future (INC or ζ=0) 
Density of the 
TFPQ 
distribution 
TFPQ 
Density of the 
TFPQ 
distribution 
TFPQ 
Incumbents who do 
not diversify in the 
future (INC or ζ=0) 
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This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1997 
conditional on diversification (ζ) and entry status (θ).  n = 560 
** See Table 3 for regression output that compares the four means of these distributions 
ALI = Diversified firm (ζ=1, θ=1); INC = Incumbent who did not diversify (ζ=0, θ=1); NOV1 = Taxi-only 
start-up (ζ=0, θ=0); NOV2 = Diversified start-up (ζ=1, θ=0) 
 
Taxi incumbents who do 
not laterally diversify 
(INC or ζ=0, θ=1) 
 
Diversified start-ups 
(NOV2 or ζ=1, θ=0) 
Taxi-only start-ups 
(NOV1 or ζ=0, θ=0) 
Figure 3 Distributions of taxi-only total factor productivity (TFPQ) ** 
 
1997 total factor productivity conditional on diversification and entry status  
(ΔTFPQi | ζ, θ) 
 
 
 
TFPQ  
Taxi incumbents who diversify into 
limousines (ALI or ζ=1, θ=1) 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A – 1992 and 1997 cross sections of taxi and limousine data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Taxi only Taxi only Taxi & Limo 
 1992 (n=1020) 1997 (n=1106) 1997 (n=2341) 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
TFPQ / multifactor TFP 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.79 -0.01 0.95 
Total revenue ($000) 511 1694 965 2491 650 2321 
Taxi revenue ($000) 511 1694 595 2157 324 1524 
Taxi + limo capital ($000) 185 874 431 1342 349 1017 
Taxi capital ($000) 185 874 227 1104 168 647 
Total vehicles (taxi + limo) 18 61 39 81 33 76 
Total taxis 18 61 26 74 22 73 
Fleets with 2 taxis / vehicles 0.32 0.47 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 
Fleets with 3-5 taxis / vehicles 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.43 
Fleets with 6-10 taxis / vehicles 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.39 
Fleets with 11-25 taxis / vehicles 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.38 
Fleets with 26-50 taxis / vehicles 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.26 
Fleets with >50 taxis / vehicles 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.31 
Fleet owned taxis (share) 0.83 0.37 0.56 0.34 0.58 0.35 
Focused incumbent 0.99 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35 
Taxi & limo diversifier n/a n/a 0.40 0.49 0.54 0.41 
Focused start-up n/a n/a 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 
Taxi & Limo start-up n/a n/a 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 
Taxi firm exits after 1992 0.34 0.47 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Future taxi to limo diversifier 0.26 0.43 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Taxis in the county 270 534 626 772 520 741 
Limos in the county 145 276 322 482 244 390 
Limo market concentration (HHI) 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.32 
County population (000) 1238 1152 1231 1236 1123 1547 
County square miles 723 1501 778 1534 951 2056 
Sole proprietor 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 
Partnership 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 
Cooperative 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 
       
Panel A columns (1) and (2) include all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), taxi 
revenue  $10K, at least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or 1997.  
Panel A column (3) includes all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), total (taxi + 
limo) revenue  $10K, at least 2 vehicles (taxicabs + limousines), and at least 2 fleets (taxi + limo) in their 
market (county) in 1997  Note that Census Bureau restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and 
maximum variable values. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B – Balanced panel 
 
n=560 1992  1997  
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
     
TFPQ 0.05 0.68 0.11 0.80 
Taxi revenue ($000) 675 1900 849 2739 
Taxi capital ($000) 230 930 319 1294 
Total taxis 21 63 33 79 
Fleets with 2 taxis 0.27 0.44 0.09 0.29 
Fleets with 3-5 taxis 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 
Fleets with 6-10 taxis 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
Fleets with 11-25 taxis 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.40 
Fleets with 26-50 taxis 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
Fleets with >50 taxis 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 
Fleet owned taxis (share) 0.86 0.33 0.63 0.36 
Taxi to limo diversifier n/a n/a 0.54 0.50 
Taxis in the county 228 480 472 673 
Limos in the county 103 228 221 414 
Limo market concentration. (HHI) 0.05 0.13 0.32 0.36 
County population (000) 885 1036 985 1148 
County square miles 861 1642 878 1714 
Sole proprietor 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Partnership 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 
Cooperative 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
     
Panel B includes all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), taxi revenue  $10K, at 
least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in both 1992 and 1997.  Note that Census 
Bureau restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and maximum variable values. 
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Table 2 Diversification and the productivity of taxi-specific assets 
 
TFPQi1997 – TFPQi1992 = a + B1ζi + XicBc + ei 
Dependent variable = Change in total factor productivity (ΔTFPQ) 
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)   
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS   
          
Taxi to limo  -0.45 *** -0.53 *** -0.41 *** -0.46 **  
 diversifier (ζ) (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.19)   
          
Middle 1/3 of 1992      -0.08  -0.09   
 size ($Taxi K) distrib.     (0.09)  (0.09)   
          
Largest 1/3 of 1992 size     0.15 * 0.13   
 size ($Taxi K) distrib.     (0.07)  (0.10)   
          
Corporation     -0.06  -0.05   
     (0.06)  (0.07)   
          
ΔCounty taxi      0.20 *** 0.20 ***  
 ownership rate-i     (0.07)  (0.07)   
          
Δlog(taxis in      0.02  0.02   
 the county-i)     (0.03)  (0.03)   
          
Δlog (limos in      -0.02  -0.02   
 the county-i)     (0.03)  (0.03)   
          
Δlog (county pop.)     -0.20  -0.21   
     (0.29)  (0.28)   
          
Constant 0.30 *** 0.38 *** 0.39 *** 0.42 ***  
 (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.15)   
          
N 560  560  560  560   
R
2
 0.08  n/a  0.12  n/a   
          
1
st
 stage summary statistics 
F-statistic   32    10   
t-statistic on IV   -5.6    -5.3   
R
2
   0.05    0.12   
N   560    560   
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level 
Results in this table include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 (limousines), taxi 
revenue  $10K, ≥2 taxicabs, and ≥2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in both 1992 and 1997.   
The excluded status category is incumbents who did not laterally diversify.  The excluded size category is 
the smallest 1/3 of the 1992 size distribution measured in terms of dollars of taxi capital. 
The 2SLS estimates use IV = HHI index of lagged (1992) market (county) concentration of limos. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrument is not necessary at the 1% 
level [χ2= 33 in column 2(b)] 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3 Diversification and organizational rigidity 
 
TFPi1997 = a + Xσθ(σi,θi)Bσθ+ XicBc + ei 
 Taxi-only Pooled (Taxi and Limo) 
 Dep. var. = total factor 
productivity (TFPQ) 
Dep. var. = multi-factor 
productivity (TFP) 
         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Taxi to limo  -0.66 *** -0.61 *** -0.84 *** -0.85 *** 
 diversifier (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
         
Taxi and -0.67 *** -0.62 *** -0.84 *** -0.79 *** 
 limo start-up (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
         
Taxi only  -0.23 ** -0.17 ** -0.26 *** -0.18 ** 
 start-up (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
         
Middle 1/3 of the „97    0.02    -0.01  
 sz. ($Taxi K) distrib.   (0.10)    (0.05)  
         
Largest 1/3 of the „97    0.16 *   0.14 * 
 sz. ($Taxi K) distrib.   (0.09)    (0.08)  
         
Corporation   0.16 *   0.21 *** 
   (0.08)    (0.04)  
         
Log (total county    0.07    0.07 * 
 taxis-i)   (0.06)    (0.03)  
         
Log (total county    -0.06    -0.03  
 limos-i)   (0.05)    (0.03)  
         
Limousine SIC      0.11 ** 0.09  
 indicator     (0.06)  (0.06)  
         
Constant 0.43 *** 0.12  0.33 *** -0.04  
 (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.06)  
         
N 1106  1106  2341  2341  
R
2
 0.13  0.16  0.20  0.23  
         
ΔIncumbent TFPQ  -0.21 ** -0.17 ** -0.26 ** -0.23 ** 
- ΔStart-up TFPQ  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.10)  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level 
The results in the “Taxi-only” regressions include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 
(limousines), taxi revenue $10K, ≥2 taxicabs, and ≥2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or 
1997.  The “Pooled” regressions include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 
(limousines), taxi + limo revenue  $10K, ≥2 vehicles, 2 fleets in their market in 1997. 
The excluded status category is incumbents who did not laterally diversify.  The excluded size category is 
“smallest 1/3 of the 1997 size distribution measured in dollars of taxi capital.” (or taxi+limo capital) 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix:  Estimating the Costs of Organizational Rigidity 
 
Let firm i‟s productivity be completely characterized by a function f that transforms two 
parameters θ and ζ into output plus a noise term ε that has mean zero, where θ captures 
whether the firm is a start-up or incumbent firm, and ζ captures whether the firm is a one 
product firm or a two product firm:   
 
TFPi = f(θ,ζ) + εi 
  θ=1 if it is an incumbent and zero otherwise 
  ζ=1 if the firm is a two product firm and zero otherwise. 
   
No incumbent firms were two-product firms in the pre-period so that when TFP=f(1,1) 
we hypothesize that there is an interaction effect between θ and ζ that captures the cost of 
organizational change: 
 
C(δ) = g(θ*ζ) > 0 when θ=1 and ζ=1 and is zero otherwise. 
 
Therefore,  
 
E[f(1,1)] = E[f(1,0)] + E[f(0,1)] – C(δ). 
 
The second hypothesis assumes more experienced firms are more productive so that 
E[f(1,0)] – E[f(0,0)]>0.  I have confined the analysis to the case where increasing levels 
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of firm scope leads to increased coordination costs so that by assumption E[f(0,1)] – 
E[f(0,0)]<0.
24
  I therefore normalize E[f(0,0)]=0 without loss of generality.   
 
I test the assumption (A1) that incumbents generally outperform start-ups by netting the 
average productivity of one-product incumbents against one-product start-ups: 
 
 (i) E[f(1,0)] – E[f(0,0)] = V(θ=1). 
 
Where V(θ=1) is the average value of being an incumbent.  A1 predicts that V(θ=1)>0. 
 
The gross effect of incumbency and change in firm scope can be computed by subtracting 
the average productivity of two-product start-ups from the average productivity of lateral 
diversifiers: 
 
 (ii) E[f(1,1)] – E[f(0,1)]  
  = [E[f(1,0) + E[f(0,1)] – C(δ)] – E[f(0,1)] = V(θ=1) – C(δ). 
 
Netting equations (i) and (ii) recovers the cost of change in firm scope.  The second 
hypothesis predicts that C(δ)>0.  
  
 
                                                 
24
 Note that if taxicabs and limousines are complementary with respect to output the bias would lead us to 
reject the second hypothesis when we should not. 
